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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
SO WOLF ROAD 
ALBANY, NEW YORK 12205 
BOARD MEMBERS 
MINUTES OF BOARD MEETING 
ROBERT D. HELSBY
 7 . 7 C 
CHA.RMAN July 1, 1975 
JOSEPH R. CROWLEY Albany, New York 
PRESENT: 
ROBERT D. HELSBY, Chairman 
JOSEPH R. CROWLEY, Member 
FRED L. DENSON, Member 
Staff: Jerome Lefkowitz, Deputy Chairman 
Martin L. Barr, Counsel 
Paul E. Klein, Director of Public Employment Practices & Representation 
Ellen K. Zimmermann, Secretary to the Board 
1. Minutes of June 24, 1975 Board meeting approved. 
2. Decisions and Orders 
A. U-1052 & U-1130 - In the Matter of Town of Orangetown, Respondent, and 
Town of Orangetown Unit, Rockland County Chapter, Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Charging Party. (#2A-7/l/75) 
B. U-1319 - In the Matter of Board of Education of Malone Central School 
District, Respondent, and Malone Central Teachers Association, Charging 
Party. (#2B-7/l/75) 
C. U-1243 - In the Matter of Faculty Association of the Community College of 
The Finger Lakes, Respondent, and County of Ontario, Charging Party. (#2C-7/l/75) 
D. U-1499 - In the Matter of Village of Malone, Respondent, and Malone Village 
Unit of Franklin County Chapter, C.S.E.A., Charging Party. (#2D-7/l/75) 
Certification after election 
E.& C-1233 - In the Matter of Town of Greenport, Employer, and Town of Greenport 
F Unit, Columbia County Chapter, Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Petitioner. (#2E and #2F-7/l/75) 
G. C-1235 - In the Matter of County of Oneida and Oneida County Sheriff's 
Department, Joint Employer, and Oneida County Deputy Sheriff's Benevolent 
Association, Petitioner, and Oneida County Chapter, CSEA, Inc., Intervenor. 
(#2G-7/l/75) 
Certification without election 
H. C-1237 - In the Matter of New York City Transit Authority, Employer, and 
City Employees Union, Local 237, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
Petitioner. (#2H-7/l/75) ^ncr£ 
?85< 
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I. C-1224 - In the Matter of Incorporated Village of Port Jefferson, Employer, 
and Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Petitioner. (#21-7/1/75) 
3. Board Administration 
A. U-1012 - In the Matter of Hempstead Union Free School District, Respondent, 
and Hempstead Schools 'Association of 'Administrators, Charging Party. 
After reviewing Counsel's June 12 memorandum (§3A-7/l/75) , the Board un-
animously agreed that (1) retroactivity to the date of the salary increases 
for Messrs. Crawford and Watkins was intended; (2) the requisite formal 
.__ demand should be^made to comply with this intention; and (3) if the _^ 
District refuses to comply with the Board's order, contempt proceedings 
should be commenced. Counsel to so inform the parties. 
B. Role of Counsel's Office with respect to extreme provocation allegations 
in strike proceedings. After considering memoranda of June 14 and 20, 1975 
(#3B-1 & 2-7/1/75) on staff role regarding extreme provocation in strike 
proceedings, the Board agreed that, staff will informally explore this 
situation further when it schedules meetings in the Fall with school 
administrators and school union personnel. After such "work-out", staff 
will report conclusions and recommendations to the Board. 
C. C-1249 - In the Matter of New York State Thruway Authority, After hearing 
oral argument today with regard to the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation's investigation of the sufficiency of SEIU 
showing of interest, the attached letter was issued to the parties. 
(83C-7/1/75) 
D~ Scope of Negotiations disputes that are subject to procedures of OCB. 
The Board considered procedures involving scope of negotiations disputes 
that are the subject of the procedures of Office of Collective Bargaining 
and implemented the attached memorandum (#3D-7/l/75). It was agreed, 
however, that this procedure would not be formalized into any hard and 
fast memorandum of understanding. Instead, this outline would simply 
serve as an informal guideline in handling the matters in question. 
Next Board meeting will be held on August 19, 1975 at 9:30 a.m. or prior thereto, 
at the pleasure of the Board. 
A oQ-o>,xj •"£-
/^Secre tary to tlz^ Board 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATION BOARD 
#2A-7/l/75 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF ORANGETOWN, 
Respondent, 
-and-
TOWN OF ORANGETOWN UNIT, ROCKLAND COUNTY CHAPTER, 
CIVIL SERVICE~^ffX0YET^rA^S0^IATI0N7TNC."7 
Charging Party. 
This case comes to us on the exceptions of the Town of Orangetown 
Unit, Rockland County Chapter of the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. 
(CSEA) from a decision of a hearing officer dismissing its charge that the 
Town of Orangetown (employer) had refused to negotiate in good faith with it 
in violation of Civil Service Law Section 209-a.l(d) by failing to pay the 
salary scales for certain reallocated positions as set forth in a then current 
agreement. The underlying dispute involved the incremental step at which re-
allocated employees should be paid following reallocation. CSEA alleged that a 
reallocated employee should be placed on the same incremental step in the re-
allocated grade as he had been in the previous grade. The employer alleged that 
upon reallocation the employee should be paid the same salary as in the previous 
grade, provided, however, that if the salary for a step in the higher grade did 
not coincide with his previous salary, he should be placed on the next higher 
incremental step. Both CSEA and the employer relied upon the current contract 
and interpretations of it in support of their respective positions. Although 
that contract provided for binding arbitration, salary disputes were excluded 
from arbitration; thus, the grievance mechanism did not provide a procedure for 
the final resolution of this dispute. Nevertheless, the hearing officer 
declined to reach the underlying dispute as he concluded that the charge did not 
>••• <OOtJ i 
BOARD DECISION AND 
ORDER 
CASE NOS. U-1052 
U-1130 
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allege a unilateral change in any existing term or condition of employment. He 
determined that "[t]he sole issue presented is one of interpretation of a 
contract" and dismissed the charge. 
The relationship between an employer's contractual duty to abide by 
its contract and its statutory duty not to alter terms and conditions of employ-
ment unilaterally is a matter that we addressed ourselves to on a number of prior 
occasions, unfortunately,~our words^ih"some decisionsT have been at^variahce 
with our actions in others. CSEA's exceptions in the instant case confront the 
difficult issue directly and, in order to resolve that issue, we must resolve 
the confusion. The exceptions raise two points — (1) the unilateral action of 
an employer in failing to pay agreed-upon salary increases is a violation of 
that employer's duty to negotiate in good faith; thus the hearing officer erred 
in declining to consider the underlying dispute, and (2) the evidence supports 
CSEA's posture in the underlying dispute. It is the first exception that focuses 
our attention on the critical issue. 
Relevant Prior Decisions 
We first considered the relationship of an alleged contract violation 
to the prohibition against unilateral changes in terms and conditions of employ-
ment in Matter of East Meadow Teachers Association, 4 PERB 3659 (1971). In that 
decision we confronted the question (at p. 3661), "Does this Board have general 
jurisdiction to police and enforce negotiated agreements between public employers 
and employee organizations within this State?" We concluded that it does not. 
1 
In doing so, we contrasted the Taylor Law with the statutes of Hawaii and 
1_ 
Wisconsin. Nevertheless, we found that conduct which might constitute a breach 
1 Section 89-13(a)(8) as reported in GERR RF 51:2018 provides that it shall be 
a prohibited practice for a public employer to "violate the terms of a 
collective bargaining agreement". . 
2 Section 111.84(1)(e) as reported in GERR RF 51:5813 provides that it shall 
be an unfair labor practice for an employer "to violate any collective 
bargaining agreement previously agreed'upon...." ' 
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of contract might also constitute the unilateral imposition of terms and con-
ditions of employment in violation of statute. Indeed, in that case we found 
such to be the case and held the employer to be in violation of the law. A 
second case in which we dealt with the relationship between contract violations 
and unilateral changes in terms and conditions of employment is Matter of Board 
of Education of the City of New York, 5 PERB 3094 (1972) and 6 PEKB 3022 (1973). 
In the first opinion in that case we determined that an alleged breach of 
contract involving the reassignment of rating responsibilities from one group 
of supervisors to another did not raise a question of unilateral alteration of 
terms and conditions of employment because "[t]he assignment of responsibilities 
to one group of supervisors or to another is a management prerogative" (p. 3095) 
and thus not a term and condition of employment. In the second opinion we con-
sidered an allegation that the employer had unilaterally modified compensation 
practices for work performed by employees after normal school hours. We said 
(at p. 3023): 
"The initial question before us upon reargument was whether, 
as alleged in the charge, the employer's action constituted 
a violation of the statute, a breach of contract, or both. If 
only a breach of contract (as in the case of reassignment of 
rating responsibilities) the matter is not subject to our 
jurisdiction. If only a violation of law, the matter is not 
subject to the grievance procedure. If, however, the same 
conduct constitutes both a violation of statute and a breach 
of contract, both procedures apply. Such is the case here." 
It was in that case that we first enunciated the policy (at pp. 3023, 3024) that 
although 
"[o]rdinarily, we decline to assert jurisdiction over such 
questions because of our policy not to interpret agreements 
where the parties have established a system of self-government 
that is designed to answer the question.... [w]e do not defer 
to the grievance procedure developed by the parties in the 
instant case because it lacks binding arbitration, [footnote 
omitted] and, therefore does not conclusively dispose of the 
issue." 
The last case we discuss in which we articulated the proposition that breach of 
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an agreement by an employer does not, per se, constitute a refusal to negotiate 
in good faith, is Matter of Administrative Board of the Judicial Conference of 
the State of New York, 6 PERB 3032 (1973). In that case we said (at p'. 3033), 
"In its brief, the charging party argues that any contract 
violation constitutes a violation of [CSL] §§209-a.l(a) and 
(d); as' a unilateral change in working conditions, it is a 
violation of the employer's duty to negotiate in good faith, 
and to the extent that it cannot be resisted by an employee 
—organization-,—it—is^an— embarrassment—to—that -employee-organic .__. 
zation that inevitably undermines its effectiveness....Although 
this argument is not without some force, we reject the propo-
sition that every contract violation, or even every rejection 
of a grievance award by a public employer is, per se, a refusal 
to negotiate or an interference with the organizational rights 
of public employees." 
3 
In this decision we contrasted the Taylor Law with the laws of Pennsylvania and 
4 
Nevada. We did not deal with the alleged contract violation as a unilateral 
change in terms and conditions of employment in that ease, but the circumstances 
were unique. The status of the charging party as a recognized or certified 
organization was not clear and we determined that its status as representative 
of the employees must first be resolved under our representation procedures. 
Against the East Meadow, New York City Board of Education and Judicial 
Conference cases, in all of which we distinguished between contract and statutor}' 
violations, we now consider three cases which are among several in which we 
found the violation of a contract to have constituted a refusal to negotiate in 
good faith. The first of these is Matter of Board of Education of the City of 
_3 Section 1201(a), as reported in GERR RF 51:4716 prohibits public employers 
from "refusing to comply with the provisions of an arbitrator's award". 
h_ Our decision quoted the Nevada Law as prohibiting local government employees 
and their organizations from violating the terms of a collective bargaining 
agreement. That language is not now found in the Nevada Law as reported in 
GERR RF 51:3711, et seq. 
3860 
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Buffalo, 4 PERB 3754 (1971). In that case we ascertained that although the 
employer had sufficient funds to apply to the second year of a two-year agree-
ment, it refused to do so because it did not have sufficient funds to apply to 
both contract matters and to noncontract matters that it deemed to be more 
important. We declined to defer to the contractual arbitration procedure in 
that case, saying (at p. 3756}: 
"A sine quo non for such deference would appear to be that the 
unilateral action taken is based upon a substantial claim of 
contractual privilege (citation omitted). 
In the case before us, it cannot be said that the subject 
unilateral changes were based upon a substantial claim of 
contractual privilege; rather, the record seems clear that 
the unilateral changes herein complained of were made without 
any color of right under the contract." 
The second case is Matter of Yonkers Housing Authority, 7 PERB 3033 (1974). In 
that case we determined that the employer violated its duty to negotiate in good 
faith when it violated its contractual obligation to pay increments while nego-
tiating a successor contract. Confirming our decision, the Appellate Division, 
Second Department said, in Matter of Municipal Housing Authority v. PERB, 
46 App.Div 2d 911 (1974): 
"Petitioner's conduct, during the life of the existing agreement 
and while negotiations for a new agreement were in progress, 
could be interpreted, as intended to exert economic pressure 
and went right to the heart of whether petitioner was bargaining 
in good faith." 
The third case is Matter of Jefferson County Board of Supervisors, 6 PERB 3063 
(1973). We found this case to be like the Buffalo case in that the employer was 
repudiating a contract rather than relying upon it for its conduct. Asserting 
jurisdiction over the breach of contract, we found that it constituted a vio-
lation of the statute. On appeal, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department 
(Matter of Jefferson Board of Supervisors v. PERB, 44 App.Div 3d 893 [1974]), 
found that PERB had jurisdiction over the charge that the employer had refused 
OOOi 
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to negotiate in good faith when it failed to fund a merit salary increment that 
had been agreed to. It further found (at p\ 894), "that there was substantial 
evidence to support PERB's determination that petitioner attempted unilaterally 
to alter its contract with the Faculty Association with respect to merit incre-
5 
ments". 
Discussion 
Reviewing what we have said and what we have done in prior cases and 
considering the language of Civil Service Law Section 209-a.l(d), we are per-
suaded that conduct which constitutes a violation of a collectively negotiated 
agreement will almost invariably constitute a unilateral change in terms and 
conditions of employment, and thus a refusal to negotiate in good faith. The 
only exception that comes to mind is when the contract clause that is claimed to 
have been violated does not involve a mandatory subject of negotiations, as in 
New York City Board of Education. 
The public policy underlying the Taylor Law is to promote harmonious 
and cooperative relationships between governments and their employees (CSL §200) 
We can conceive of few acts that are as disruptive to harmonious and cooperative 
relationships as is the disregard of collectively negotiated agreements. Thus, 
given the responsibility of this Board to advance the public policy underlying 
the Taylor Law and to prevent improper practices, we deem it unreasonable to 
interpret our jurisdiction so narrowly as to exclude unilateral changes in terms 
and conditions of employment that may also constitute violations of contract. 
The decision of the Appellate Division in Jefferson County supports this 
analysis. We have, however, and will continue to exercise restraint in con-
nection with this jurisdiction. It is also the policy of the Taylor Law to 
5_ PERB's order was reversed on other grounds. The court held that PERB did not 
have authority to direct the employer to comply with its contract. This 
reversal was affirmed by the State Court of Appeals at NY 2d (1975). 
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encourage public employers and employee organizations to agree upon procedures 
for resolving disputes (CSL §200). Thus, where an employer that is charged with 
unilateral action defends its conduct on the basis of a claim of contractual 
right, and where the parties have agreed upon binding arbitration to resolve 
disputes between them, we will defer to the arbitrator in accordance with the 
standards set forth in our decision in Matter of New York City Transit Authority 
4 PEEB 3669. (1971). Where there is no serious claim of contractual right as 
in Buffalo Board of Education and Jefferson County, or where arbitration is not 
available as in New York City Board of Education or in the instant case, we will 
not withhold our jurisdiction. 
This brings us to CSEA's second objection, to wit, that the evidence 
supports its posture in the underlying dispute. This is a question that should 
be resolved by the hearing officer in the first instance. 
NOW, THEREFORE, we remand this case to the hearing officer for a 
determination on the merits of the charge. 
Dated: Albany, New York 
July 1, 1975 
Ttobert D. Helsbv^enairman 
V* rJh<2/>-^_ 
1 
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DISSENT OF BOARD MEMBER, JOSEPH R. CROWLEY 
It would seem that the thrust of the majority's decision is that the 
denial of any contractual benefits by an employer will constitute an improper 
practice and thus be subject to this Board's jurisdiction absent any provision 
for binding arbitration. 
This Board has concluded in the past that it does not have plenary 
authoxity--to_adminlster__and-enforce-_contracts—between—public—employers—and 
employee organizations.— I regard this conclusion as sound and as one 
contemplated by the Legislature of this State in that the Legislature did not 
opt as other jurisdictions did to make a breach of such an agreement an 
2/ improper practice.— The majority decision is a departure from such conclusion. 
Under the holding of the majority, a refusal by a public employer to 
pay an individual employee overtime or a holiday premium allegedly due under a 
contract xrould be deemed a unilateral change in terms and conditions of 
employment and thus a prima facie improper practice. As noted supra, it does 
not seem that the Legislature intended such a result. Once negotiations have 
resulted in an agreement, the parties may and should agree upon procedures for 
enforcement, and absent such agreement, may seek enforcement in the courts. 
Further, the course charted by, the majority deeply and extensively 
involves this Board in contract interpretation. 
I do not find that this Board has been granted broad jurisdiction to 
interpret a collective agreement. Admittedly, there may be occasions when it 
is necessary for this Board to interpret provisions of an agreement, but to the 
1/ East Meadow Teachers Association, 4 PERB 3659 (1971); New York City Board 
of Education, 6 PERB 3022 (1973); cf NLRB v. Strong, 393 U.S. 357, 360. 
2/ Cf Wisconsin Sec. 111.84(1); see FN 2 in majority opinion. 
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limited extent of determining whether there has been a statutory violation, for 
example, to determine whether an employee organization has waived its right 
to negotiate on a particular subject so as to permit unilateral action by an 
employer.— 
In summary, I would find that in situations where an employer 
unilaterally institutes or establishes a term of employment not expressly 
provided for in the agreement or withdraws a benefit not provided for in the 
contract without negotiating about it with the representative organization, 
this Board xirill take jurisdiction of a charge even though the employer relies 
upon a provision in the contract claiming either a right so to do or as 
constituting a waiver by the employer organization of its right to negotiate 
re same. 
However, in a situation where the employer refuses to implement an 
express provision in the contract, or does so in a manner which the employee 
organization feels is not in accordance with the provision in the contract, 
what would be involved is a pure contractual question and the enforcement of 
the contract as such, and thus outside the jurisdiction of this Board. In 
brief, when an employer's obligation to act or not to act is wholly contractual, 
the enforcement of such obligation should be dealt with either by arbitration 
(if the parties had so agreed) or by a plenary action. 
In the instant case, I agree with the hearing officer that this is 
solely a question of interpretation as to how the contract should be implemented 
I would affirm the hearing officer. 
I realize that the conclusion reached by the majority is one designed 
to prevent the disruption of harmonious and cooperative relationships between 
public employers and employee organizations which disruption can be brought 
into being by the disregard of a negotiated agreement and also to avoid the 
necessity of relegating aggrieved employees to the delays and inconveniences 
3/ Cf NLRB v. C & C Plywood, 385 U.S. 421. 
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which may be attendant in plenary actions. However, I believe that the problem 
is one that should be addressed by the Legislature, either to expressly provide 
that breach of a negotiated agreement will be deemed an improper practice or to 
mandate by legislation the inclusion of a grievance arbitration clause in 
all agreements between public employers and employee organizations respresenting 
public employees. 
Dated: July 1, 1975 
Albany, New York 
Joseph R. Crowte; 
O *o> 
I n t h e M a t t e r of 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF MALONE CENTRAL SCHOOL 
jDISTRICT, 
R e s p o n d e n t , 
- and -
JtfALONE CENTRAL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD #2B-7/l/75 
BOARD DECISION AND 
ORDER 
CASE NO. U-1319 
This matter comes before us upon exceptions filed by the Malone 
Central Teachers Association (hereafter referred to as the Association), the 
charging party, from a decision by the hearing officer dismissing its improper 
practice charge against the Board of Education of the Malone Central School 
District (hereafter referred to as the Board of Education), the respondent. 
Che charge alleged that the employer violated Sections 209-a.l(a), (b) and (d) 
of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (hereafter referred to as the Act-
Dy unilaterally withdrawing on September 9, 1974 the previously enjoyed benefit 
3f binding arbitration of grievances while the parties were negotiating a suc-
essor contract to one that expired the previous June. 
1/ 
L/ These sections of the Act make it an improper employer practice deliberately 
.. (a) to interfere with, restrain or coerce public employees in the exercise 
>f their .rightsrguaranteed in section two hundred two for the purpose of de-
priving them of such rights; (b) to dominate or interfere with the formation or 
administration of any employee organization for the purpose of depriving them 
Df such rights; ...(d) to refuse to negotiate in good faith with the duly 
recognized or certified representatives of its public employees." 
? 
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The matter was submitted to the hearing officer on a stipulated 
record which among other things indicated that in the Spring of 1974 the parties 
began negotiations for a successor agreement to the one expiring on June 30, 
1974. The stipulated record also provided the following: 
"The Board of Education did not offer a 
written contract proposal of its own and both parties 
agreed that all items in the then current contract, which 
was due to expire on June 30, 19747 ^"ourd^emaihT^he-same, 
unless either party requested that a particular item be 
modified or amended. 
"The written proposals offered by the Malone 
Central Teachers Association did not seek a modification 
or amendment in the Maintenance of Staff or the Grievance-
Arbitration provisions of the contract. The Board of 
Education did not offer any proposals that sought amendment 
of the Maintenance of Staff or the Grievance-Arbitration 
provisions. Furthermore, the amendment or modification 
of these matters were not discussed during the negotiations. 
"The only matter that remained unresolved between the 
parties during the entire course of negotiations was the 
subject of an economic package." (Emphasis supplied) 
In June of 1974, the District's budget was defeated and in July of 
1974, pursuant to an austerity budget, the dental hygiene program was eliminated. 
Thereafter, the Association lodged a grievance protesting the elimination of two 
dental hygiene positions which resulted from the discontinuation of the 
program. The employer denied the grievance on the basis that staffing was not 
"a negotiable item" or a grievable subject. The Association then demanded 
arbitration in August of 1974. The Board refused to arbitrate the matter and 
on November 6, 1974 successfully obtained a court order permanently staying the 
arbitration proceeding. At the same time, the Court vacated a stay that it had 
previously issued prohibiting the Association from proceeding with an improper 
practice charge filed with PERB in September, 1974. As a result, the improper 
practice charge was reactivated. 
3868 
_ I 
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The hearing officer dismissed the charge on the basis that the parties 
had only reached a tentative agreement on the grievance arbitration procedure and 
that since a final contract had not been entered into, the grievance arbitration 
procedure was inapplicable. The hearing officer further determined that the 
subject matter sought to be arbitrated was not a mandatory subject of negotia-
tions and thus could be unilaterally changed by the employer without the Taylor 
Law being violated. 
We do not agree with the conclusions reached by the hearing officer. 
The terms of the stipulation indicate that the "parties agreed that all terms in 
the then current contract....would remain the same, unless either party requested 
that a particular item be modified or amended" (emphasis added) and that neither 
party proposed to change the grievance arbitration provisions. 
Where, as in the present matter, the parties had a grievance 
arbitration procedure in a predecessor contract and where they had in fact 
agreed to incorporate it into a successor contract when consummated, then that 
grievance arbitration procedure is applicable and enforceable during the hiatus 
2/ between the two contracts. We are aware that Article 7501 of the CPLR— requires 
that agreements to arbitrate be in writing. Nonetheless, on the facts herein 
presented, we believe that there has been "sufficient compliance" with the 
statute as it has been interpreted by the Court of Appeals, Acadia Company, Inc. 
v. Edlitz, 7 NY 2d 348 [I960]. We view the agreement of the parties to include 
2/ "A written agreement to submit any controversy thereafter arising or any 
existing controversy to arbitration is enforceable without regard to the 
justiciable character of the controversy and confers jurisdiction on the 
courts of the state to enforce it and to enter judgment on an award. In 
determining any matter arising under this article, the court shall not 
consider whether the claim with respect to which arbitration is sought is 
tenable, or otherwise pass upon the merits of the dispute. As amended L. 
1963, c. 532, §47." 
OQ£Q 
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the old grievance/arbitration procedure into the successor agreement (as set 
forth in the parties' stipulation) as satisfying the Court of Appeals' inter-
pretation of CPLR Article 7501 in that it effectively operates as an extension 
of the old agreement until such time as a new agreement is consummated con-
taining the agreed upon clause. To hold otherwise (particularly in the absence 
of the employee organization's right to strike) would be potentially disruptive 
of the promotion of harmonious employee/employer relations as contemplated 
by the Act. The presence of this agreement makes our conclusion stronger than 
if it were grounded only on our reasoning in Matter of Triborough Bridge and 
Tunnel Authority, 5 PERB 3064 (1972) but that reasoning still applies. In 
that decision we held that an employer is obliged by law to maintain existing 
terms and conditions of employment during negotiations until the parties 
conclude a successor agreement. The obligation imposed by Triborough is not 
predicated upon the terms or even the existence of a prior contract but applies 
to all terms and conditions of employment however established including the 
grievance/arbitration procedure between the parties: 
"It is of no consequence that the employee benefit withdrawn 
by respondent derived from an expired agreement. Our decision 
would be the same if during the course of negotiations an 
employer unilaterally withdrew such an employee benefit that 
had been previously enjoyed by the employees even if there 
had been no prior contractual duty to furnish the benefit." 
We do not see that the Appellate Division's decision in the Poughkeepsie 
3/ 
case— has any precedential value with regard to the instant case since that case 
did not involve an agreement by the parties to carry forward the provisions of 
the old grievance arbitration procedure into the new contract. Moreover, the 
4/ decision of the Supreme Court to permanently stay arbitration of this matter— 
3/ 44 AD 2d 598, affd 75 Misc. 2d 931. 
Board of Education of Malone Central School District v. Malone Central 4/ 
Teachers Association, (Supreme Court, Franklin County, NovemberBy^2fiJ4) 
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is not dispositive of the issue as to whether or not any improper practice has 
been committed by the respondent. This Board has primary jurisdiction in 
this regard and we find that the respondent cannot unilaterally change the 
grievance arbitration procedure without prior negotiations concerning such 
change. 
We -further—note-that- the basis-of- the- charge-and-the-issue-presented 
for consideration is the effectiveness of the grievance arbitration procedure 
during the hiatus between contracts and not whether the employer was within 
its rights when it reduced staff. The hearing officer erred in giving 
consideration to the underlying merits of the dispute to be arbitrated, i.e., the 
authority of the Board of Education to eliminate the two dental hygiene positions 
A distinction is to be drawn between an improper practice charge which has as 
its basis the effectiveness of a grievance/arbitration procedure during the 
hiatus between contracts and an improper practice charge which is based upon 
an employer's refusal to arbitrate the merits of a particular dispute during 
the hiatus between contracts. Our decision here touches only upon the effec-
tiveness of the grievance/arbitration procedure and not upon the arbitrability 
of the merits of the dispute. Arbitrability of the merits of a dispute which 
arises during the hiatus between contracts is properly determined by 
the arbitrator or by the courts using, inter alia, the criteria set forth in our 
Triborough decision. 
Thus, we conclude that the respondent has violated Section 209-a.l(d) 
of the Act by refusing to negotiate in good faith, the essential element of that 
violation being that it unilaterally withdrew the previously enjoyed benefit 
of binding arbitration of grievances while the parties were negotiating a succes-
sor contract to the one which expired the previous June. We find no similar 
violation based on Section 209-a.l(a) or (b) of the Act. <r50l^M'1 
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WE ORDER the Board of Education of Malone Central School District 
to negotiate in good faith with the Malone Central Teachers 
Association. 
Dated: July 1, 1975 
Albany, New York 
Board - U-1319 
DISSENT OF BOARD MEMBER, JOSEPH R. CROWLEY 
In dissenting from the conclusion reached by my brothers, I do not 
intend to indicate any measure of departure from the Triborough doctrine as 
such. Rather, I find the Triborough doctrine to be inapplicable in this 
instance. 
Tfie~Tri6oroug6 doctrine as enforced by this Board to date is not 
based on any contractual obligation of the parties for in Triborough we deal 
with a situation where the contract has expired. Conversely, the obligation 
to submit a dispute to arbitration is by way of an agreement in writing (CPLR 
§7501, _et seq) . In the instant case the agreement to submit the dispute to 
arbitration . had expired and no new agreement concerning an arbitration clause 
had been executed. Therefore, I find that the refusal on the part of the 
employer to submit the subject dispute to arbitration does not constitute a 
violation of §209-a.l(d). The Acadia decision relied upon by the majority 
does not, in my opinion, support their conclusion (In the Matter of the 
Arbitration between Acadia Company, Inc. and Irving Edlitz, 7 NY 2d 348). 
In that case, the parties orally extended a written agreement containing an 
arbitration clause. The Court concluded that the oral extension of a written 
agreement was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of CPA §1449, now CPLR §7501 
In the instant case, we have no such oral extension of the expired written 
agreement. Indeed, counsel for the charging party in his brief conceded that 
"the parties did not formally agree to an extension of the expiring contract." 
Rather, there was simply an understanding of the parties that in an agreement to 
be executed in the future incorporating economic terms still to be negotiated, 
such an agreement would include an arbitration clause. Thus, the facts in 
the instant case are so different from those in the Acadia decision that 
reliance on that decision here would seem to be misplaced. ^X^T/^i 
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I also question the power and jurisdiction of the Board to resolve 
an issue of arbitrability, namely, the existence of a written agreement to 
arbitrate; it seems clear that the Legislature has provided that arbitrability 
is a question to be resolved by the courts, CPLR §7501 et seq. Further, the 
issue of arbitrability in the instant case was submitted to the court pursuant 
to the statutory provision and it was therein determined that arbitration be 
stayed, Board of Education of Malone Central School District v. Malone 
Central Teachers Association, (Supreme Court, Franklin County, November 6, 1974) 
Dated: July 1, 1975 
Albany, New York 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD #2C-7/l/75 
In the Matter of 
FACULTY ASSOCIATION OF THE COMMUNITY COLLEGE OF 
THE FINGER LAKES, 
Respondenty 
and 
COUNTY OF ONTARIO, 
Charging Party. 
BOARD DECISION AND 
ORDER. 
Case No. U-1243 
This case comes to us upon the exceptions of the County of Ontario 
(hereinafter the County) from a decision of a hearing officer dismissing its 
charge that the Faculty Association of the Community College of the Finger 
Lakes (hereinafter the Association) refused to negotiate in good faith with it 
upon its demand for negotiations. The Charge had alleged a violation by the 
Association of CSL Section 209-a.2(b). 
The hearing officer also dismissed charges by the Association that 
the County had violated CSL 209-a.l(a), (b), and (d) in that the County had 
improperly filed its improper practice charge in this case and that it had 
insisted upon mediation without first exhausting the possibilities of direct 
negotiations. A third aspect of the Association's charge is that the County 
had rejected consideration of the Association's demand for retroactivity. No 
exceptions were filed by the Association with respect to the hearing officer's 
dismissal of its charges. 
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The County's exceptions enumerate seven dissatisfactions with the 
decision of the hearing officer. In essence these dissatisfactions relate to 
determinations by the hearing officer that delays ' and the conduct of 
negotiations attributable to the Association do not reflect any deliberate in-
tention to delay negotiations, but rather derive from inefficient office 
procedures. TK^ County aTsl^^bjl^^ 
its representatives must bear some responsibility for delaying negotiations. 
Finally the County challenges a finding of the hearing officer that the 
conduct of the Association at the August 15 negotiations' meeting when it 
insisted that the meeting be restricted to a discussion of negotiating procedures 
and it refused to negotiate substantive issues was not inappropriate. In 
connection with each of these dissatisfactions with the findings of the hearing 
officer, the County alleged that he overlooked or disregarded relevant evidence. 
DISCUSSION 
We have afforded the County an opportunity to present oral argument 
in support of its exceptions. We have also received from it an extensive brief 
and a reply brief responding to the brief submitted by the Association. Having 
reviewed the record and considered the oral and written arguments of the parties, 
we confirm the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the hearing 
officer. On the analysis of facts and the reasoning contained in his opinion, 
we dismiss the County's charge. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER THAT the charge of the County of Ontario 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OE MALONE, 
Respondent, 
-and-
MALONE. VILLAGE UNIT OF FRANKLIN COUNTY 
CHAPTER, C. S. E^A. ,_ _ 
Charging Party. 
On February 18, 1975 the Malone Village Unit of Franklin County 
Chapter, C.S.E.A. (CSEA) filed an improper practice charge under Section 209-a.l 
(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) alleging that the 
Village of Malone (Village) was committing an improper practice by refusing to 
negotiate in good faith with respect to shift scheduling demands made by the 
firefighters. Since the charge raised issues primarily involving a dispute 
between the parties as to the scope of negotiations under the Act, expedited 
treatment of the matter was accorded under Sections 204.2(b) and 204.4 of the 
Rules of Procedure. 
On March 13, 1975 the parties entered into a stipulation which is 
reproduced verbatim in Appendix "A" to this decision. 
On March 25, 1975 the Village moved to dismiss the charge on the 
grounds that it was not timely filed. In support of its position, the Village 
urged that CSEA's demands and its refusal to negotiate occurred in April of 1974 
and that the charge was not filed until February 1975, which was beyond the 
four-month period during which our Rules permit the filing of a charge. There-
after, the stipulated facts and motion were submitted to the Board for consider-
ation. 
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A hearing was held on May 9, 1975 to consider the question of time-
liness of the charge only. The facts that were stipulated to on March 13, 1975 
were deemed sufficient to resolve the other issues. CSEA, through its witnesses, 
established that demands to negotiate the matter were made several times sub-
sequent to the initial demand. More specifically, demands were made to either 
the Village negotiator or directly to the Village Board in December 1974 and 
again in January 1975. Thus, the issue presented to us is whether the four-
month period began to run from the first demand and refusal or from the last 
demand and refusal. 
It is our opinion that the time period for filing this improper 
practice began to run from the date of the last demand and refusal. The purpose 
of placing a four-month limitation on the period during which an improper prac-
tice charge can be filed is to prevent the prosecution of stale claims. Normally 
a four-month period is an adequate period for a potential charging party to 
investigate and assess the acts of the potential respondent, to make a deter-
mination as to whether a charge should be filed and, in fact, to prepare and 
file the charge. While the Village's original refusal to acquiesce in the demand 
to negotiate shift schedules in the present case was not in the nature of a 
continuing violation, neither was CSEA precluded from renewing that demand. Each 
presentment of a demand to negotiate a mandatory subject of negotiations and each 
refusal gives rise to a new charge until the matter has been ultimately disposed 
of by this body or by agreement of the parties. The negotiation process, by its 
very nature, is one of give-and-take. To require a potential charging party to 
file its charge after the first refusal of its demands to negotiate a particular 
subject, reduces the degree of flexibility needed to carry out meaningful and 
effective negotiations. Thus, we conclude that the charge in the present matter 
was timely filed, based on the date of the last demand and refusal to negotiate. 
3878 
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With regard to the negotiability of the subject of scheduling of 
shifts of the firefighters, we have constantly and consistently held that this 
is a mandatory subject of negotiations (In the Matter of the City of White 
Plains, 5 PERB 3013 [1972] and In the Matter of the City of Albany, 7 PERB 3142 
[1974]). Our position was clearly articulated in the White Plains case, where 
we said (at p. 3015): 
"It is the City alone which must determine the 
number of firemen it must have on duty at any 
given time. It cannot be compelled to negotiate 
with respect to this matter. However, there are 
many ways in which the schedules of individuals 
and groups of firemen may be manipulated in order 
to satisfy the City's requirement for fire pro-
tection. It is this manipulation of the schedules 
of individuals and groups of firemen which is 
involved in the Fire Fighters' demand. Within the 
framework which the City may impose unilaterally 
that a specified number of Fire Fighters must be 
on duty at specified times, the City is obligated 
to negotiate over the tours of duty of the Fire 
Fighters within its employ." 
A proceeding under Sections 204.2(b) and 204.4 of our Rules of 
Procedure is designed to determine whether certain demands constitute mandatory 
subjects of negotiations. An employer's refusal to negotiate over such 
matters pending our determination on negotiability need not carry with it 
any implication of impropriety, notwithstanding the fact that the matter arises 
under Section 209-a of the Act, which declares refusal to negotiate in good 
faith to be an improper practice. Our order reflects this consideration. 
We sustain the charge, and, 
WE ORDER that the Village of Malone negotiate 
in good faith with CSEA with respect 
to the demand of shift scheduling^-
387 
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Dated: Albany, New York 
July 1, 1975 
Jpsepb/ R . C r o w l e y ~ 7 
E'red L. Deifson 
ihA^-fT ^ 
While the case was accorded expedited treatment, an inordinate delay in 
reaching a decision on the merits was caused by the scheduling of an 
additional hearing on respondent's motion to dismiss. Additional delay 
was caused by reason of the unavailability of a transcript on a timely basis 
from the hearing reporter. 
Attch. 
APPENDIX "A" 
In the Matter of 
Village of Malone 
Case No. U-1499 
STIPULATION 
It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between the parties that: 
1) On or about April 9, 1974 the Malone Village Unit of 
Franklin County Chapter, C.S.E.A., presented i[t]s negotiating 
proposals for a collective agreement for the fiscal year June 1, 
, -3-974-ghru May~31"7"_1975^to"th"e~VilTage_"of^Maton_e;—-These—proposals^ 
included a proposal that unit employees in the Fire Department 
"remain on the 24 hour work shift in effect on January 1, 1974." 
(The contractual work shift language as of January 1, 1974 is 
attached.) [Appendix "B"] 
2) At that time the Village stated its position that said proposal 
is not a mandatory subject of negotiations, and still maintains 
that position. 
3) The parties agree that the charge herein raises primarily a 
dispute as to the scope of negotiaties [negotiations], i.e., 
whether said proposal is a mandatory subject of negotiations, 
and request PERB to accord expedited treatment to this matter 
pursuant to §204.4 of its Rules of Procedure. 
Dated: March 13, 1975 
(signed) Bryan J. Hughes 
Village of Malone 
For: 
(signed) William F. Maginn Jr. 
Malone Village Unit, Franklin 
County Chapter, CSEA 
C O P Y 
APPENDIX "B" 
From page 8 of Contract, under ARTICLE ELEVEN - WORK YEAR, WORK DAY AND WORK WEEK 
"4. It is also agreed for Employees in the Fire Department, except 
the Fire Chief, for the period June 1, 1973, to May 31, 1974, the 
basic work day shall be a twenty-four (24) hour consecutive period 
and the basic work week shall be forty-two (42) hours on an annual 
basis, until January 1, 1974, at which time the work week shall be 
reduced to forty (40) hours." 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
Employer, 
IN THE. MATTER -OF 
TOWN OF GREENPORT, 
-and-
TOWN OF GREENPORT UNIT, COLUMBIA 
COUNTY CHAPTER, CIVIL SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Petitioner. 
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Case No. C-1233 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected; . 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Town of Greenport Unit, Columbia 
2ounty Chapter, Civil Service Employees Association, Inc.,' 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above named public employer, in the unit described below, 
as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All employees of the Town of Greenport employed 
in the Highway Department (laborer and the assistant superin-
tendent) , the Landfill Department (landfill attendant) and 
the Water and Sewer Department (laborer and working foreman). 
Excluded: All other employees of the employer. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Town of Greenport, Columbia 
County Chapter, Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall ' 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
Signed on the 1st day of u^-.l-y 19 75 
ilH&M/ff. Cfo&tS&i 
PERB 5 8 ( 2 - 6 8 ) 
FRED L . DENSON 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
Employer, 
IN THE MATTER OF 
TOWN OF GREENPORT, 
-and-
TOWN OF GREENPORT UNIT, COLUMBIA 
COUNTY CHAPTER, CIVIL SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Petitioner. 
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Case No.' C-1233 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Town of Greenport Unit, Columbia 
County Chapter, Civil Service'Employees Association, Inc., 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above named public employer, in the unit described below, 
as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: • Included: All police personnel. 
Excluded: the chief of police. 
PERB 58( 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall' negotiate collectively with Town of Greenpbrt Unit, Columbia 
County Chapter, Civil Serv ice Employees Association, Inc., 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
Signed on the 1st day of July 19 75 . 
ROBERT D.; HELSBY^ Chairman 
2-68) F'RED L." DENSON 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF ONEIDA AND ONEIDA COUNTY 
SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, 
_an<3_ Joint Employer, 
ONEIDA COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF'S 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, . 
-and-
ONEIDA COUNTY CHAPTER, CSEA, INC., 
intervenor. 
#2G-7/2/75 
Case No. c-1235 
PERB 58( 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation.proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the. Board by the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Oneida County Deputy Sheriff's 
Benevolent Association 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above named public employer, in the unit described below, 
as their exclusive representative for the .purpose of collective . 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: 
Included: All employees of the Oneida County Sheriff's 
Department. 
Excluded: Sheriff, Undersheriff, Captains, Secretary to 
Sheriff, and assistant mechanics. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED'that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Oneida County Deputy Sheriff's 
Benevolent Association 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances.. 
Signed on the 1st day of J u l y 19 75 
.2-68) 
ROBERT D. HELSBY,. Chai rman 
J O S J B P H / R . CROWJdEY " / 
••9QO 
FRED L. DENSON ^ o u i " 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Employer, 
• -and-
CITY EMPLOYEES UNION, LOCAL 237, 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OP TEAMSTERS, 
Petitioner. 
#2Hr-7/l/75 
Case No. C-1237 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected; 
Pursuant "to the authority vested in. the Board by the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that City Employees Union, Local 237, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above named public employer, in the unit described below, 
as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: 
Included: All photographers and senior photographers. 
J-
Excluded: All other employees. 
PERB 58( 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with City Employees Union, Local' 237, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
Signed on the 1st day of July 19 75. 
2-68) 388S" 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#21-7/1/75 
In the Matter of 
INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF PORT JEFFERSON, 
Employer, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
'INC., 
Case No. C-1224 
.Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested' in the Board by the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc. 
has been designated and selected by a majority'of the employees 
of the.above named public employer, in the unit described below, 
as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: 
Included: All full-time and regular part-time 
village employees. 
Excluded:' Elected officials, village attorney, 
village,clerk, deputy village clerk, 
village treasurer, part-time 
recreation leader, seasonal and 
temporary employees and general 
highway foreman. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc. 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances.-
PERB 58 ( 
Signed on the 1st day of. July 19 75 
ROBERT D. HELSBJ,, Chairman 
:>-68) FRED L. DENSON 
MEMORANDUM. 
§3A~7/l/75 
J u n e 1 2 , 1975 
TO: The Board 
FROM: M a r t i n L. B a r r 
JRE-t — Hempsiead--Pjublic--S_cho_als_,_Cas_e_No_.JI-_iai2 
We have been requested, in effect, to initiate contempt 
proceedings against the school district for non-compliance 
with that part of the PERB order requiring that the principals, 
who are members of the Hempstead Schools Association of Ad-
ministrators be granted a pay raise for the 1973/74 school 
year commensurate to the increase given to two principals who 
were not members of the Association. A brief history follows. 
On May 13, 1974, upon affirming the hearing officer's 
conclusion that such action was motivated by union animus and 
constituted a violation of §209-a.1(c) and (d), PERB ordered, 
j-iiL.&i? alia. that the district: 
3. forthwith grant salary increases to all 
remaining building principals in the 
District comparable to the salary increases 
accorded to Crawford and Watkins. 
Because the District refused to comply, PERB brought an 
enforcement proceeding which resulted, on January 17, 1975, 
in a judgment ordering compliance in all respects. The Dis-
trict did not appeal. 
I have been advised that on April 17, 1975, the District 
adopted the following resolution: 
RESOLVED, in accordance with the Decision of the 
Public Employment Relations Board of the 
State of New York in Case #U-1012 and in 
• accordance with the Order of the New York 
State Supreme Court in Albany, New York, 
enforcing said Order, that Building Prin-
3887 
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Ziegfeld v. Norworth, 148 A.D. 185, 191. In Ross v. Butler, 
57 Hun. 110, 112, the court stated that the judgment sought 
to be enforced "shall.be definite and certain, that there shall 
be no opportunity for ambiguity, but that the party proceeded 
against is to be adjudged to do a certain specific act; if it 
is to pay money, then to pay a specific sum of money." See also 
Matter of Battista, 176 M. 85, 86, holding that in order to 
punish for contempt, "an order or decree must direct without 
ambiguity and in language which may readily be understood by a 
layman. . ." and Dwyer v. Oyster Bay,28 M.. 2d 952, 953, holding 
that "the language of the order claimed to have been violated 
must be clear and unequivocal [emphasis in original]." 
There can be little doubt that the intent of the PERB order 
was to requirement payment retroactive to the date the increases 
were improperly granted to the non-member principals. There is, 
perhaps, more doubt that the court can be persuaded that this 
is the only rational construction that can be given to the order. 
However, since it is necessary to construe the order or infer 
the maker's intent, the court may find it difficult to hold the 
district in contempt. 
The issues thus raised for PERB's consideration are: 
1. Whether retroactivity was intended; 
2. If so, whether the requisite formal demand be 
made upon the District that it comply, the effect 
of which would be to make the district aware that 
a contempt proceeding is contemplated; and 
3. If the district remains adamant, whether a con-
tempt proceeding should be commenced. 
MLB:RMp 
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MEMORANDUM 
June 20, 1975 
TO: Robert D0 Helsby 
Jerome Lefkowitz _s ^ ______________ . 
FROM: Martin L» Barr 
RE: Participation of Counsel's Office with respect to extreme 
provocation in strike proceedings 
Quite some time ago I asked Jerry Thier to give me his thoughts 
on the principles which should govern counsel's participation in 
the development of the record in strike proceedings with respect 
to the issue of extreme provocationc The attached is the memo that 
he prepared for me„ I agree with the analysis and conclusions0 
The question is not a new one0 I think that our activities 
conducted in line with the considerations articulated in Jerry's 
iiiSuio are Drcoueir iincier trtis LISM S.LI'JL iiftcftssarv if tins Board's respon-
sibilities are to be properly carried out0 
The complaints expressed by attorneys for NYSUT are not new. 
Similar complaints have been presented before„ I believe that our 
present procedures should not be altered or counsel's role further 
diminished„ 
tn 
< « S . mux SMPiOYM t^ 
_ STATIONS SOASD '"' 
JUN 2 0 1975 
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TO: M a r t i n L . B a r r . ; 
FROM: Jerome Thier i 
RE: Role of Counsel's Office with respect to extreme pro- | 
vocation allegations in strike proceedings. j 
! 
In accordance with our conversation, I am setting forth j 
my views with respect to development of the record in connection X 
with allegations of extreme provocation made#by employee organ- | 
izations in strike proceedings. j 
, ! 
i 
To start, it must be borne in mind that the purpose of the | 
strike proceedings, whether or not combined with improper practice ! 
proceedings, is to develop a record upon which the Board can 
determine the penalty, if any, to be imposed upon an employee 
organization where it appears that the employee organization has • 
engaged in a strike against a public employer. One factor, of 
course, in determining the penalty, if any, to be imposed, is 
whether the employer has engaged in acts of extreme provocation. 
•  It is my understanding that Counsel is charged by PERB's 
) rules with developing the record necessary to enable PERB to make 
upon its Counsel in order to insulate its hearing officers and 
Itself from any investigative role which might provide them with 
knowledge outside the record developed at a hearing. As you 
know, this is an essential element of fairness and due process 
in matters requiring a hearing. 
This responsibility of.Counsel brought claims by employee ' 
organizations, both in combined improper practice proceedings 
in which the same facts are alleged to constitute extreme pro-
vocation and an improper practice, and in strike proceedings 
alone, that PERB's Counsel is representing the employer. These 
organizations asserted that PERB's representative should not be. 
in this position, urging that it destroys PERB's neutrality. 
After considering these claims, the Board adopted a policy 
under which Counsel is to encourage public employers to intervene 
in strike proceedings where there is a claim of extreme provoca-
tion. The question now arises as to Counsel's role in developing 
the record upon a claim of extreme provocation when there is such 
intervention. 
I believe Counsel's role should remain basically unchanged, 
r While it may be good public relations to stay out of that part of 
the hearing which deals with extreme provocation, this can.only • 
be done when the employer is adequately developing the record. 
This is so because the ultimate responsibility for developing j 
3891 ! 
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PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
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FRED L. DENSON 
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B O A R D M E M B E R S 
ROBERT D. HELSBY 
CHAIRMAN 
Mr. John Geagan, Director of Organization 
Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIQ, 
Mr. John MacArthur 
NYS Thruway Authority . ' • 
Richard . Burstein, Esq. 
DeGraff, Foy, Conway & Holt-Harris 
Re: C-1249 - NYS Thruway Authority 
Gentlemen: 
I am writing to you- on behalf of my colleagues on the Public 
Employment Relations Board. 
Earlier today we heard presentations from each of you regarding • 
the procedures being followed by the Director of Public Emplo3r-
ment Practices and Representation in investigating the 
authenticity of the showing of interest in this matter. During 
the course of your presentations concern was expressed for the 
preservation of the confidentiality of persons executing showing 
of interest cards. Nevertheless, it was recognized that it is 
necessary on occasion to conduct an investigation to ascertain 
the authenticity of the showing of interest. We share both 
concerns. 
Accordingly, we are instructing the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation to review his methods in conducting 
the. current and future investigations into the authenticity'of 
showing of interest in order to maximize the preservation of 
confidentiality. When, because in his judgment issues of public 
interest outweigh the need to preserve strict confidentiality 
and the Director contemplates methods of investigation that 
might compromise that confidentiality, he shall discuss those 
methods of investigation with the Board before implementing 
them. 
Very truly yours.. ./' 
Robert D. Helsby s O O i J ^ 
cc - Pau l E. Kle in , Esq. . / 
iA.JlUk 
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FROM: ' Robert D. Helsby rf/J ^ .. 
SUBJECT: Scope of Negotiarr6rjs"Disputes - NYC 
The following procedure is proposed to avoid confusion and forum shopping in 
the event of scope of negotiations disputes that are subject to the procedures 
of OCB: 
1. General Procedures -
PERB and OCB will send each other all jurisdictional documents relating to 
cases in which there is a possibility of simultaneous jurisdiction. PERB 
\ . will invite OCB to have a representative participating in. pre-hearing 
conferences in all such cases. (Should PERB be invited to have a represen-
2. Disputes that exclusively raise scope of negotiations questions: 
a. If the dispute is presented to OCB and not to PERB there is no problem. 
It should.be handled by OCB. 
• b. If a dispute is brought before PERB (it is irrelevant whether .or not 
it is also brought before OCB), and the party respondent before PERB • .. 
makes an objection in its answer to PERB's assertion of -jurisdiction 
on the ground that it is a matter to be considered by OCB and indicating 
that it has commenced or will be commencing a scope of negotiations case 
before OCB, PERB should defer to OCB subject to PERB's right to reconsider 
(Collyer Standards) in the event that OCB's disposition of the case'is 
unsatisfactory. 
c. If the dispute is brought before PEPJJ (it is irrelevant whether or not it 
is also brought before OCB), and the respondent does not object to PERB's 
assertion of jurisdiction and does not request the matter be deferred to 
OCBir-PE-RB--and--OG-B-wi-l-l-inmedi-ately-con#er--as-to-how--t-he--case--should be 
handled. . Such cases will be decided on a case by case basis. 
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